Interference Assisted Secret Communication by Tang, Xiaojun et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
8.
23
97
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
17
 A
ug
 20
09
1
Interference Assisted Secret Communication
Xiaojun Tang, Ruoheng Liu, Predrag Spasojevic´, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract
Wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping attacks because of its broadcast nature. This paper
illustrates how interference can be used to counter eavesdropping and assist secrecy. In particular, a wire-tap
channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI) is considered. Here, a transmitter sends a confidential message to
its intended receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper and with the help of an independent interferer.
The interferer, which does not know the confidential message, helps in ensuring the secrecy of the message by
sending an independent signal. An achievable secrecy rate and several computable outer bounds on the secrecy
capacity of the WT-HI are given for both discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels.
Index Terms
Information-theoretic secrecy, wire-tap channel, interference channel, eavesdropping, interference
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast and superposition are two fundamental properties of the wireless medium. Due to its broadcast
nature, wireless transmissions can be received by multiple receivers with possibly different signal strengths.
This property makes wireless communications susceptible to eavesdropping. Due to the superposition property
of the wireless medium, a receiver observes a superposition of multiple simultaneous transmissions resulting in
interference. This paper illustrates how one can pit the superposition property of the wireless medium against
eavesdropping by using interference to assist secrecy.
Our approach follows Wyner’s seminal work on the wire-tap channel [1], in which a single source-destination
communication is eavesdropped upon via a degraded channel. Wyner’s formulation was generalized by Csisza´r
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2and Ko¨rner who studied general broadcast channels [2]. The Gaussian wire-tap channel was considered in
[3]. In these models, it is desirable to minimize the leakage of information to the eavesdropper. The level of
ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential messages is measured by the equivocation rate.
Perfect secrecy requires that the equivocation rate is asymptotically equal to the message rate, and the maximal
achievable rate with perfect secrecy is the secrecy capacity. The central idea of [1]–[3] is that the transmitter
can use stochastic encoding to introduce randomness to preserve secrecy. In this paper, we study the problem
in which a transmitter sends confidential messages to the intended receiver with the help of an interferer, in
the presence of a passive eavesdropper. The difference between this model and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s model
is that there is an additional transmitter, who functions as an interferer without any knowledge of the actual
confidential message sent by the primary transmitter. We call this model the wire-tap channel with a helping
interferer (WT-HI). The external transmitter provides additional randomization to increase the secrecy level
of the primary transmission. We choose the transmission schemes at both the interferer and the legitimate
transmitter to enhance the secrecy rate.
To understand the effects of interference in wireless transmissions, the interference channel (IC) has been
extensively studied. The capacity region of interference channels remains an open problem, except for some
special cases including the strong/very strong interference regimes [4] and [5]. The best achievable rate region
so far was proposed by Han and Kobayashi [6]. Several outer bounds for the Gaussian IC with weak interference
were proposed in [7]–[10], and more recently a new outer bound was proposed independently in [11]–[13] to
obtain the sum-capacity in a very weak interference regime.
The secrecy capacity of interference channels remains even more elusive. In [14], an achievable secrecy rate
region and an outer bound were proposed for the discrete memoryless interference channel with confidential
messages (IC-CM). An achievable secrecy rate was also proposed for Gaussian IC-CMs. In [15], the secrecy
capacity region was found for a special class of cognitive interference channels, in which the cognitive user
knows the message sent by the primary user non-causally and the primary user is constrained by using
deterministic encoding. Secret communication on interference channels was also studied in [16]–[18]. In [16],
an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of a class of one-sided interference channels was presented. In
[17], the robust-secrecy capacity was defined and characterized for a special deterministic interference channel.
In [18], an interference alignment scheme was proposed for the purpose of preserving secrecy.
The information-theoretic secrecy approach has also been applied to study other various multi-user channel
models such as the multiple access channel with confidential messages (MAC-CM) [19], [20], the multiple
access wire-tap channel (MAC-WT) [21], and the relay-eavesdropper channel (REC) [22], [23]. We refer the
reader to [24] for a recent survey of the research progress in this area.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: First, for general discrete memoryless
3WT-HI models, we consider all possible interference patterns and design the corresponding achievable coding
scheme at the legitimate transmitter based on the coding rate of the interference codebook. We propose an
achievable secrecy rate for this channel by optimizing the coding schemes at both the interferer and the
legitimate transmitter. Second, for a Gaussian WT-HI, we provide an achievable secrecy rate based on Gaussian
codebooks and describe a power policy to optimize the secrecy rate. Our results show that the interferer can
increase the secrecy level, and that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved even when the source-destination
channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper channel. An important example for the Gaussian case is that in
which the interferer has a better channel to the intended receiver than to the eavesdropper. Here, the interferer
can send a (random) codeword at a rate that ensures that it can be decoded and subtracted from the received
signal by the intended receiver, but cannot be decoded by the eavesdropper. Hence, only the eavesdropper
is interfered with and the secrecy level of the confidential message can be increased. In particular, when the
interferer-receiver channel is good enough and the power used at the transmitters is unconstrained, the achieved
secrecy rate for the Gaussian WT-HI is equal to the secrecy rate achieved when the message is given to the
helper secrectly and the helper resends the message. This is particularly interesting because we do not assume
that there is a secret transmitter-interferer channel (which would enable the interferer to relay the transmission).
Finally, we provide several computable upper bounds on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WT-HI model.
Each of them can be a better upper bound than others under certain channel and power conditions. For some
special cases, the best upper bound is quite close to the achievable secrecy rate.
The WT-HI model has been studied in part within the context of the REC [22], MAC-WT [21] and IC-
CM [14] models. Our achievable scheme can be considered to be a generalization of the schemes proposed
previously. In the cooperative jamming [21] scheme or the artificial noise scheme in [14] (both proposed for
Gaussian channels), the helper generates an independent (Gaussian) noise. This scheme does not employ any
structure in the transmitted signal and can be considered as a special case of our scheme when the coding
rate of the interference codebook is large (infinity). The noise forwarding scheme in [22] requires that the
interferer’s codewords can always be decoded by the intended receiver, which can be considered as a special
case of our scheme when the coding rate of the interference codebook is lower than a certain rate such that
the intended receiver can decode the interference first. By taking a holistic view, we obtain a number of new
insights.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model for the WT-HI.
Section III states an achievable secrecy rate and a Sato-type upper bound for general discrete memoryless
channels. Section IV studies a Gaussian WT-HI model, for which an achievable secrecy rate and a power
policy for maximizing the secrecy rate, together with several computable upper bounds on the secrecy capacity
are given for the Gaussian WT-HI model. Section V illustrates the results through some numerical examples.
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Fig. 1. A wire-tap channel model with interference: a transmitter wants to send a confidential message W1 to the intended receiver
while keeping the message secret with respect to an passive eavesdropper, in the presence of an active interferer.
Conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1, we consider a communication system including a transmitter (X1), an intended
receiver (Y1), a helping interferer (X2), and a passive eavesdropper (Y2). The transmitter sends a confidential
message W1 to the intended receiver with the help of an independent interferer, in the presence of a passive
but intelligent eavesdropper. We assume that the eavesdropper knows the codebooks of the transmitter and
the helper. Furthermore, we assume that the transmitters do not share any common randomness and also
that the helper does not know the confidential message W1. As noted above, we refer to this channel as the
wire-tap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI). The channel can be defined by the alphabets X1, X2, Y1,
Y2, and channel transition probability p(y1, y2|x1, x2) where xt ∈ Xt and yt ∈ Yt, t = 1, 2. The transmitter
encodes a confidential message w1 ∈ W1 = {1, . . . ,M} into xn1 and sends it to the intended receiver in n
channel uses. A stochastic encoder [2] f1 is specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities f1(x1,k|w), where
x1,k ∈ X1, w1 ∈ W1,
∑
x1,k
f1(x1,k|w1) = 1 for all k = 1, . . . , n, and f1(x1,k|w1) is the probability that the
encoder outputs x1,k when message w1 is being sent. The helper generates its output x2,k randomly and can
be considered as using another stochastic encoder f2, which is specified by a matrix of probabilities f2(x2,k)
with x2,k ∈ X2 and
∑
x2,k
f2(x2,k) = 1. We assume that Xn1 and Xn2 are independent. Since randomization
can increase secrecy, the legitimate transmitter uses stochastic encoding to introduce randomness. Additional
randomization is provided by the helper and the secrecy can be increased further.
The decoder uses the output sequence yn1 to compute its estimate wˆ1 of w1. The decoding function is
5specified by a (deterministic) mapping g : Yn1 →W1. The average probability of error is
Pe =
1
M
M∑
w=1
Pr {g(Y n1 ) 6= w1|w1 sent} . (1)
The secrecy level (level of ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential message w1) is
measured by the equivocation rate (1/n)H(W1|Y n2 ).
A secrecy rate Rs is achievable for the WT-HI if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an (M,n, Pe) code so that
M ≥ 2nRs , Pe ≤ ǫ (2)
and Rs − 1
n
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≤ ǫ (3)
for all sufficiently large n. The secrecy capacity is the maximum of all achievable secrecy rates.
III. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNELS: ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE AND UPPER BOUND
In this section, we consider the general discrete memoryless WT-HI model. We present an achievable secrecy
rate with an outline of its achievable coding scheme. We also present a computable upper bound on the secrecy
capacity.
A. Outline of An Achievable Coding Scheme
An achievable scheme involves two independent stochastic codebooks. The encoder at the legitimate trans-
mitter uses codebook C1(2nR1 , 2nR1,s , n), where n is the codeword length, 2nR1 is the size of the codebook,
and 2nR1,s is the number of confidential messages that C1 can convey (R1,s ≤ R1). In addition, the encoder
at the interfering helper uses codebook C2(2nR2 , n), where 2nR2 is the codebook size. This codebook can be
considered to be the C2(2nR2 , 1, n) code where the number of messages that C2 can convey is 1 (and therefore
with zero effective rate).
The random secrecy binning [1] technique is applied to C1, so that the 2nR1 codewords are randomly grouped
into 2nR1,s bins each with 2n(R1−R1,s) codewords, where each bin represents a message. During the encoding,
to send message w1 ∈ W1, the encoder selects one codeword uniformly and randomly in the w-th bin and
sends it to the channel. Meanwhile, the encoder at the interferer randomly selects a codeword in C2 and sends
it to the channel.
In the decoding, after receiving y1, the intended receiver declares that wˆ1 is sent if either of the following
two events occur:
1) (separate decoding): there is only one codeword in C1 that is jointly typical with y1 and the bin index
of this codeword is wˆ1;
62) (joint decoding): there is only one pair of codewords in C1 and C2 that are jointly typical with y1 and
the bin index of the codeword in C1 is wˆ1.
The intended receiver declares that a decoding error occurs if neither 1) nor 2) happens. (Please see Appendix
I for the details.)
B. Achievable Rate
Note that in the achievable scheme, the intended receiver can perform either a joint decoding or a separate
decoding. When joint decoding is performed, the intended receiver needs to decode both codewords from C1
and C2. This is essentially a multiple-access channel (MAC) (X1,X2) → Y1. Hence, We let R[MAC]1 denote
the achievable rate region of the MAC (X1,X2)→ Y1 defined by
R[MAC]1 =


(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1|X2),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1,X2;Y1)


. (4)
When separate decoding is performed, the intended receiver does not need to decode C2. Instead, it treats the
codewords from C2 as interference. An achievable rate (region) for this separate decoding is given by
R[S]1 =


(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1),
R2 > I(X2;Y1|X1)


. (5)
Hence, as shown in Fig. 2, the “achievable” rate region in the R1-R2 plane at the receiver is the union of
R[MAC]1 and R[S]1 .
Similar analysis applies for the eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 2, where R[MAC]2 denotes the region of the
MAC (X1,X2)→ Y2:
R[MAC]2 =


(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 < I(X1;Y2|X2),
R2 < I(X2;Y2|X1),
R1 +R2 < I(X1,X2;Y2)


, (6)
and R[S]2 is the separate decoding region given by
R[S]2 =


(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 < I(X1;Y2),
R2 > I(X2;Y2|X1)


. (7)
7Our achievable secrecy rate is based on the above definitions of joint and separate decoding regions, and is
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The following secrecy rate is achievable for the WT-HI:
Rs = max
π,R1,R2,R1,d


R1,s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1,s +R1,d = R1,
(R1, R2) ∈
{
R[MAC]1 ∪R[S]1
}
,
(R1,d, R2) /∈
{
R[MAC]2 ∪R[S]2
}


, (8)
where π is the class of distributions that factor as
p(x1)p(x2)p(y1, y2|x1, x2). (9)
Remark 1: The rate R1 is split as R1 = R1,s+R1,d, where R1,s denotes a secrecy information rate intended
by receiver 1 and R1,d represent a redundancy rate sacrificed in order to confuse the eavesdropper. The interferer
can help by transmitting dummy information at the rate R2.
Proof: The proof consists of error analysis and equivocation computation. It can be found in Appendix
I.
Note that the encoding procedure outlined in Section III-A involves only one step of binning for C1, but in
the proof given in Appendix I, we assume an additional binning step for C1 (double binning [14]) and one
binning step for C2. However, the additional binning procedure is assumed only for simplifying the proof and is
equivalent to the coding procedure described in Section III-A. More specifically, we do the additional binning
for C1 to ensure that some random information can be decoded by the eavesdropper at the rate given by the
upper boundary of
{
R[MAC]2 ∪R[S]2
}
, if the eavesdropper is interested in decoding the random information
when the message W1 is given as side information. This facilitates the technical proof as shown in Appendix
I.
C. Some Special Cases
In the following, we consider three typical cases: weak interference/eavesdropping, strong interference/eavesdropping
and very strong eavesdropping.
1) Weak Interference/Eavesdropping: This implies that
I(X1;Y1|X2) ≥ I(X1;Y2|X2)
and I(X2;Y2|X1) ≥ I(X2;Y1|X1) (10)
for all product distributions on the input X1 and X2. This case is illustrated by Fig. 2.(a). Let
∆1 = I(X1;Y1|X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) (11)
and ∆2 = I(X1;Y1)− I(X1;Y2). (12)
81R
2R
H
I
JKLMN
O
P
QRSTU
V
W
XYZ
[
\
]^_
2R
1R
`
a
bcdef
g
h
ijk
l
m
nop
q
r
stuvw
2R
1R
x
y
z{|}~







Ł

(a) weak interference (b) strong interference (c) strong interference
Fig. 2. Code rate R1 versus dummy rate R2 for the intended receiver and eavesdropper.
The achievable secrecy rate can be increased by the help from the interferer when ∆1 ≤ ∆2. The interferer
generates an “artificial noise” with the dummy rate R2 > I(X2;Y2|X1) so that neither the receiver nor the
eavesdropper can decode C2. On the other hand, when ∆1 > ∆2, the interferer “facilitates” the transmitter
by properly choosing the signal X2 to maximize ∆1. Therefore, in the weak interference case, the intended
receiver performs a separate decoding of C1. The achievable secrecy rate can be summarized as
Rs = max
π
{max (∆1,∆2)} .
2) Strong Interference/Eavesdropping: This implies that
I(X1;Y1|X2) ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2)
and I(X2;Y2|X1) ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1) (13)
for all product distributions on the input X1 and X2. This case is illustrated by Fig. 2.(b) and Fig. 2.(c). This
condition implies that, without the interferer, the channel X1 → Y2 is more capable than the channel X1 → Y1
and, hence, the achievable secrecy rate may be 0.
However, we may achieve a positive secrecy rate with the help of the interferer. Here we choose the rate
pair (R1, R2) ∈ R[MAC]1 so that the intended receiver can first decode C2 and then C1. Therefore, in this case,
the intended receiver performs joint decoding. Moreover, the dummy rate pair satisfies
(R1,d, R2) /∈
{
R[MAC]2 ∪R[S]2
}
;
i.e., we provide enough randomness to confuse the eavesdropper. Hence, for strong interference, the achievable
9secrecy rate can be simplified as
Rs = max
π

min

 I(X1,X2;Y1)− I(X1,X2;Y2),
I(X1;Y1|X2)− I(X1;Y2)




+
.
3) Very Strong Eavesdropping: In this case,
I(X1;Y2) ≥ I(X1;Y1|X2) (14)
for all product distributions on the input X1 and X2. We cannot obtain any positive secrecy rate by using the
proposed scheme.
The secrecy rate may be increased by using the channel prefixing technique in [2, Lemma 4], as shown in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1: If X1 and X2 in R[MAC]t and R[S]t , t = 1, 2, defined by (4)-(7), are replaced with random
variables V1 and V2, respectively, and the input distribution π in (8) is replaced with π′, where π′ is the class
of distributions that factor as
p(v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) = p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2|x1, x2), (15)
then the secrecy rate given by (8) is achievable.
However, we do not follow the prefixing approach in this paper to avoid the intractability of its evaluation.
D. A Sato-type Upper Bound
A trivial upper bound on the secrecy capacity is the (main channel) capacity without secrecy constraint.
That is
Rs ≤ max
PX1 ,PX2
I(X1;Y1|X2). (16)
Here, another computable upper bound for a general WT-HI is a Sato-type upper bound.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity of the WT-HI satisfies
Rs ≤ min
PY˜1,Y˜2|X1,X2
max
PX1 ,PX2
I(X1,X2; Y˜1|Y˜2), (17)
where Y˜1 and Y˜2 are outputs of a discrete memoryless channel characterized by PY˜1,Y˜2|X1,X2 whose marginal
distributions satisfy
PY˜j |X1,X2(yj|x1, x2) = PYj |X1,X2(yj|x1, x2), (18)
for j = 1, 2 and all y1, y2, x1, and x2.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix II.
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Remark 2: The upper bound assumes that a genie gives the eavesdropper’s signal Y˜2 to the intended receiver
as side information for decoding message W . Since the eavesdropper’s signal Y˜2 is always a degraded version
of the combined signal (Y˜1, Y˜2), the wire-tap channel result [1] can therefore be used.
Remark 3: The upper bound is tight for the degraded WT-HI which satisfies
PY2|X1,X2(y2|x1, x2) =
∑
y1
PY1|X1,X2(y1|x1, x2)PY2|Y1(y2|y1). (19)
In the degraded case, the side information Y˜2 does not benefit the decoding at the intended receiver.
IV. GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
In this section, we consider a discrete memoryless Gaussian channel, for which the channel outputs at the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper can be written as
Y1,k = X1,k +
√
bX2,k + Z1,k,
and Y2,k =
√
aX1,k +X2,k + Z2,k, (20)
for k = 1, . . . , n, where {Z1,k} and {Z2,k} are sequences of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
zero-mean Gaussian noise (real) variables with unit variances. The channel inputs X1,k and X2,k satisfy average
block power constraints of the form
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[X21,k] ≤ P¯1 and
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[X22,k] ≤ P¯2. (21)
We note that the channel described by (20) satisfies the degradedness condition as defined by (19) if ab = 1
and a ≤ 1.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate
First, we give an achievable secrecy rate assuming that the transmitter and interferer use powers P1 ≤ P¯1
and P2 ≤ P¯2, respectively.
Theorem 3: When fixing the transmit power (P1, P2) for the Gaussian WT-HI model given by (20), the
following secrecy rate is achievable:
Rs(P1, P2) = max
{
RIs(P1, P2), R
II
s (P1)
}
, (22)
where RIs(P1, P2) is given by
RIs(P1, P2) =


γ (P1)− γ
(
aP1
1+P2
)
if b ≥ 1 + P1,
γ (P1 + bP2)− γ (aP1 + P2) if 1 ≤ b < 1 + P1,
γ
(
P1
1+bP2
)
− γ
(
aP1
1+P2
)
if b < 1,
11
and RIIs (P1) is given by
RIIs (P1) = [γ(P1)− γ(aP1)]+ , (23)
with γ(x) , (1/2) log(1 + x).
Proof: This rate is achieved by using the coding scheme introduced in Section III. The input distributions
π are chosen to be Gaussian N (0, P1) and N (0, P2) for C1 and C2, respectively. A sketch of a proof is provided
in Appendix III.
1) Power Policy: For the Gaussian WT-HI, power control plays an important role. Roughly speaking, the
interferer may need to control its power so that it does not introduce too much interference to the primary
transmission, while the transmitter may want to select its power so that the intended receiver is able to decode
and cancel now helpful interference either fully or partially before decoding the primary transmission.
In the following, we give a power control strategy. We consider the cases when a ≥ 1 and a < 1, separately.
When a ≥ 1, we use the following transmit power:
(P1, P2) =


(min{P¯1, P ∗1 }, P¯2) if b > 1, P¯2 > a− 1,
(P¯1,min{P¯2, P ∗2 }) if b < 1a , P¯2 > a−11−ab ,
(0, 0) otherwise,
and when a < 1, we use use the following transmit power:
(P1, P2) =


(P ∗1 , P¯2) if b ≥ 1a , P¯1 ≥ b− 1, P¯2 ≥ 1−aab−1 ,
(P¯1,min{P¯2, P ∗2 }) if b < 1, P¯1 ≥ b−aa(1−b) ,
(P¯1, 0) if 1 ≤ b ≤ a−1, P¯1 > b−11−ab
or a < b < 1, P¯1 <
b−a
a(1−b) ,
(P¯1, P¯2) otherwise,
where P ∗1 and P ∗2 are given by
P ∗1 = b− 1, (24)
P ∗2 =
(a− 1) +√(a− 1)2 + (1− ab)∆
1− ab , (25)
and ∆ = a
b
(1 + P¯1)− (1 + a)P¯1. (26)
When a > 1, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved when b > 1 or b ≤ a−1 if the interferer’s power
P¯2 is large enough. When b > 1, the interferer uses its full power P¯2 and the transmitter selects its power
to guarantee that the intended receiver can first decode the interference (and cancel it). When b < a−1, the
intended receiver treats the interference as noise. In this case, the transmitter can use its full power P¯1 and the
interferer controls its power (below P ∗2 ) to avoid excessive interference.
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When a < 1 and 1 ≤ b < a−1, the transmitter needs to restrict its power if it wants to let the receiver decode
some interference. However, if the transmitter has a large power
(
P¯1 >
b−1
1−ab
)
, it is better to use all its power
and to request that the interferer be silent. In the case when a < b < 1, the receiver treats the interference as
noise. If the transmitter does not have enough power
(
P¯1 <
b−a
a(1−b)
)
, the interference will hurt the intended
receiver more than the eavesdropper.
Lemma 1: The power policy maximizes the secrecy rate given in Theorem 3.
Proof: A proof is provided in Appendix IV.
Remark 4: The explicit form of the power policy gives some interesting insights into the achievable secrecy
rate. For example, it is clear that an interference power P¯2 can benefit secrecy. In particular, when P¯2 is
sufficiently large, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved when
(a < 1) or (b > 1) or
(
a > 1 and b < 1
a
)
. (27)
In comparison, we recall that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wire-tap channel (when there is no
interferer in the Gaussian WT-HI model) is
RWTs = [γ(P1)− γ(aP1)]+ (28)
and a positive secrecy rate can be achieved only when a < 1.
2) Power-unconstrained Secrecy Rate: The secrecy rate achievable when the transmitter has unconstrained
power depends only on the channel condition, and therefore is an important parameter of wire-tap-channel-based
secrecy systems. Here, we refer to it as power-unconstrained secrecy rate. Note that the power-unconstrained
secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wire-tap channel (assuming a 6= 0) is
lim
P¯1→∞
[
γ(P¯1)− γ(aP¯1)
]+
=
1
2
[
log2
1
a
]+
. (29)
The explicit form of the power policy facilitates a limiting analysis, based on which we obtain the following
result (assuming ab 6= 0) for the power-unconstrained secrecy rate of the WT-HI model.
Lemma 2: An achievable power unconstrained secrecy rate for the Gaussian WT-HI is
lim
P¯1,P¯2→∞
Rs =


1
2 log2 b if b > max(1,
1
a
),
1
2 log2
1
ab
if b < min(1, 1
a
),
1
2
[
log2
1
a
]+
otherwise.
(30)
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix V.
Remark 5: Compared with the power-unconstrained rate without the help of interference, a gain of (1/2) log2 b
can be observed for the WT-HI model when the interferer-receiver channel is good
(
b > max(1, 1
a
)
)
. Note that
(1/2) log2 b is the power-unconstrained secrecy rate if the confidential message is sent from the interferer to
the intended receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. Therefore, this seems as if, ‘virtually’, the message
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is given to the interferer secretly and that the interferer sends the message (a ‘cognitive’ transmitter). This is
particularly interesting because we do not assume that there is a secret transmitter-interferer channel (which
would enable the interferer to relay the transmission).
B. Upper Bounds
Again, a simple upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WT-HI is the main channel capacity
without a secrecy constraint. That is,
Rs ≤ γ(P¯1).
In the following, we describe two additional upper bounds.
1) Sato-type upper bound: The first upper bound is based on the specialization of the Sato-type upper bound
given by (17) to the Gaussian WT-HI model.
Lemma 3: The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WT-HI model given by (20) is upper bounded as
Rs ≤ f(P¯1, P¯2, ρ∗(P¯1, P¯2)), (31)
where the function f(P1, P2, ρ) is defined as
f(P1, P2, ρ) =
1
2
log
(1 + P1 + bP2)(1 + aP1 + P2)− (ρ+
√
aP1 +
√
bP2)
2
(1− ρ2)(1 + aP1 + P2) , (32)
and ρ∗(P1, P2) is given by
ρ⋆(P1, P2) =
(1 + a)P1 + (1 + b)P2 + (
√
ab− 1)2P1P2 −
√
Θ
2(
√
aP1 +
√
bP2)
(33)
with
Θ = [(
√
a− 1)2P1 + (
√
b− 1)2P2 + (
√
ab− 1)2P1P2]
× [(√a+ 1)2P1 + (
√
b+ 1)2P2 + (
√
ab− 1)2P1P2].
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix VI.
2) A Z-channel upper bound: The second outer bound for the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WT-HI
model is motivated by [16]. To derive this bound, we assume that there is a genie to provide the interference
codeword to the intended receiver. In this case, the intended receiver can cancel interference without any
cost and becomes interference-free (b = 0). The channel model becomes a one-sided interference channel (or
Z-channel).
Lemma 4: The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WT-HI model given by (20) is upper bounded by
Rs ≤ 1
2
[
log(1 + P¯1)− log(1 + aP¯1)
]+
+
1
2
log
[
2(1 + aP¯1)(1 + P¯2)
2 + aP¯1 + P¯2
]
. (34)
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix VII.
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Fig. 3. Achievable secrecy rate with or without the help of interference for a symmetric channel (a = b), where P¯1 = P¯2 = 10.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In Fig. 3, the achievable secrecy rates with helping interference and without interference are shown for
the symmetric Gaussian WT-HI model (a = b). In this example, the power constraints are P¯1 = P¯2 = 10.
The secrecy rate achieved with interference (here denoted by Rs) first decreases with a when a < 1; when
1 < a ≤ 3.26, Rs increases with a because the intended receiver now can decode and cancel the interference,
while the eavesdropper can only treat the interference as noise; when a > 3.26, Rs decreases again with
a because the interference does not affect the eavesdropper much when a is large. It can also be found that
nonzero secrecy rate can be achieved only when a < 1 when there is no help of interference. However, nonzero
secrecy rate can be achieved when a < 1 + P¯2 with the help of interference. It is clear that a larger value of
P¯2 can improve the secrecy rate more. Hence, this result shows the value of exploiting interference to assist
secrecy.
In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we present numerical results to show the achievable rate and upper bounds versus P¯2
for some non-symmetric parameter settings of a and b, where we again assume that P¯1 = 10. In Fig. 4, a
and b are fixed to be 0.5 and 10, respectively. Each of the three upper bounds is better than the others within
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy rate and upper bound versus P¯2, where a = 0.5, b = 10, and P¯1 = 10.
some certain ranges of P2. In particular, the Sato-type upper bound is the best when P¯2 is small, and the
Z-channel bound becomes the best when P¯2 is relatively larger. It is also conceivable that when P¯2 is large
(compared with a fixed P¯1), the main channel capacity, though simple, is a good upper bound. In this case, the
secret signals are hidden in very large interference at the eavesdropper, and secrecy can be achieved without
sacrificing rate.
Also note that the Z-channel bound could be quite loose for some parameter settings of a and b (especially
when a > 1). As shown in Fig. 5, where a and b are fixed to be 2 and 0.1, respectively, the Sato-type upper
bound is uniformly better than the other two bounds during the shown range of P¯2. Our numerical results
show that the Sato-type upper bound is relatively close to the achievable secrecy rate when ab is close to 1.
Note that ab = 1 corresponds to the degraded case, for which the Sato-type upper bound is always tight.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the use of the superposition property of the wireless medium to alleviate the
eavesdropping issues caused by the broadcast nature of the medium. We have studied a wire-tap channel with
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate and upper bound versus P¯2, where a = 2, b = 0.1, and P¯1 = 10.
a helping interferer (WT-HI), in which the interferer assists the secret communication by injecting independent
interference. Our results show that interference, which seldom offers any advantage for problems not involving
secrecy, can benefit secret wireless communication.
For general discrete memoryless WT-HI models, we have proposed an achievable secrecy rate which depends
on the coding rate of the interference codebook. We have considered all possible interference coding rates.
For a Gaussian WT-HI, we have given both the achievable secrecy rate and a power policy to optimize the
secrecy rate. Our results show that the interferer can increase the secrecy level, and that a positive secrecy rate
can be achieved even when the source-destination channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper channel. An
important example of the Gaussian case is that in which the interferer has a better channel to the intended
receiver than to the eavesdropper. Here, the interferer can send a (random) codeword at a rate that ensures
that it can be decoded and subtracted from the received signal by the intended receiver, but cannot be decoded
by the eavesdropper. Hence, only the eavesdropper is interfered with and the secrecy level of the confidential
message can be increased. In addition, we have provided several computable upper bounds on the secrecy
capacity of the Gaussian WT-HI. Each of the bounds can be a tighter upper bound under certain channel and
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power conditions. For some special cases, the upper bound is close to the achievable secrecy rate.
Future work of interest is to study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian interference channels with multiple
confidential messages. The WT-HI model studied in this paper is a special case of two-user interference
channel in which only one user has a confidential message to send. Therefore, we essentially have provided
some results for studying the corner point of the secrecy capacity region of two-user interference channels,
although a combination of the proposed achievable scheme and a time sharing strategy can provide an achievable
secrecy rate region for general interference channels. We believe that the achievable scheme and upper bounds
proposed in this paper can give in-depth insight and facilitate further study of general interference channel
with multiple confidential messages.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof:
1) Random Code Construction: For a given distribution p(x1, x2) = p(x1)p(x2), C1 and C2 are generated
at random. More specifically, for codebook Ct (t = 1, 2), we generate 2nRt i.i.d. sequences each of length n
at random according to p(xt) =
∏n
i=1 p(xt,i).
A further step of codebook construction is the indexing of codewords for each codebook. Our proof here is
based on an “implicit” double binning technique. That is, the 2nR1 codewords in codebook C1 are randomly
grouped into 2nR1,s bins each with 2nR1,d codewords, where R1,d = R1 −R1,s. Furthermore, in each bin, the
2nR1,d codewords are randomly grouped into 2nR′1,d sub-bins each with 2nR′′1,d codewords (and thus R1,d =
R′1,d + R
′′
1,d). Therefore, any codeword in C1 is indexed as x1(w1, w′1, w′′1) for w1 ∈ W1 = {1, . . . , 2nR1,s},
w′1 ∈W ′1 = {1, . . . , 2nR
′
1,d} and w′′1 ∈W ′′1 = {1, . . . , 2nR
′′
1,d}. The codewords in C2 are indexed as x2(w2) for
w2 ∈W2 = {1, . . . , 2nR2}.
2) Encoding and Decoding: In encoding, to send message w1 ∈W1, the encoder at the transmitter selects
w′1 ∈W ′1 and w′′1 ∈W ′′1 independently at random, and sends the codeword x1(w1, w′1, w′′1), while the encoder
at the interferer selects w2 ∈W2 at random and sends the codeword x2(w2) to the channel.
In the decoding, after receiving y1, the intended receiver declares that wˆ1 ∈W1 is received if
(i) (separate decoding): x1(wˆ1, wˆ′1, wˆ′′1 ) is the only codeword such that 〈x1(wˆ1, wˆ′1, wˆ′′1),y1〉 is jointly typical;
or
(ii) (joint decoding): x1(wˆ1, wˆ′1, wˆ′′1 ) and x2(wˆ2) are the only codeword pair such that 〈x1(wˆ1, wˆ′1, wˆ′′1 ),x2(wˆ2),y1〉
is jointly typical.
The intended receiver makes an error if neither (i) nor (ii) occurs, or if wˆ1 6= w1.
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For any (R1, R2) ∈
{
R[MAC]1 ∪R[S]1
}
, the intended receiver can always decode the message W1 reliably
with an arbitrarily small error probability when n is sufficiently large. Therefore, in the following, we only
need to analyze the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper to account for the secrecy constraint.
The parameters R′1,d and R′′1,d are different for each of two cases depending on the code rate R2 of
the (interference) codebook C2. Now we discuss those two cases separately. From the perspective of the
eavesdropper, in case I, we consider R2 < I(X2;Y2|X1), which corresponds to the rate region R[MAC]2 ; in
case II, we consider R2 ≥ I(X2;Y2|X1), which corresponds to the rate region R[S]2 .
A. Case I: R2 < I(X2;Y2|X1)
1) Codebook Parameters: We choose the following rate parameter for R′′1,d:
R′′1,d = min [I(X1, Y2|X2), I(X1,X2;Y2)−R2]− ǫ1. (35)
2) Equivocation Computation: The equivocation at the eavesdropper is bounded as follows:
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(W1|Y2,W ′1)
= H(W1,Y2|W ′1)−H(Y2|W ′1)
= H(W1,Y2,X1,X2|W ′1)−H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,Y2)−H(Y2|W ′1)
= H(X1,X2|W ′1) +H(W1,Y2|W ′1,X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,Y2)−H(Y2|W ′1)
≥ H(X1,X2|W ′1) +H(Y2|X1,X2)−H(Y2)−H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,Y2)
≥ H(X1,X2|W ′1)− I(X1,X2;Y2)−H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,Y2). (36)
For the first term, we notice that
H(X1,X2|W ′1) = H(X1|W ′1) +H(X2) = n(R1,s +R′′1,d +R2). (37)
For the second term, we first have
I(X1,X2;Y2) ≤ n [I(X1,X2;Y2)− δ1] ,
where δ1 → 0 as n→∞. We also have
I(X1,X2;Y2) = I(X2;Y2) + I(X1;Y2|X2)
≤ H(X2) + I(X1;Y2|X2)
≤ nR2 + n [I(X1, Y2|X2)− δ1] .
Therefore, we have
I(X1,X2;Y2) ≤ min [I(X1,X2;Y2), I(X1;Y2|X2) +R2]− δ1 = n
(
R′′1,d +R2
)− δ1, (38)
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where the last equality is based on (35).
To bound the third term, we consider the (joint) decoding of W ′′1 and W2 at the eavesdropper assuming
that W1 and W ′1 are given to the eavesdropper as side information. Given that W1 = w1 and W ′1 = w′1,
we assume that w′′1 and w2 are sent. The eavesdropper declares that x1(w1, w′1, wˆ′′1) and x2(w2) are sent if
x1(w1, w
′
1, wˆ
′′
1 ) is the only codeword in the sub-bin B(w1, w′1) and x2(wˆ2) is the only codeword in C2, such
that 〈x1(w1, w′1, wˆ′′1),x2(wˆ2),y2〉 is jointly typical. The eavesdropper makes an error if (wˆ′′1 , wˆ2) 6= (w′′1 , w2)
or if there is no such a codeword pair jointly typical with y2. According to (35), the rate pair (R′′1,d, R2)
satisfies the following condition: 

R′′1,d ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2),
R2 ≤ I(X2, Y2|X1),
R′′1,d +R2 ≤ I(X1,X2;Y2).
Therefore, the probability of error is arbitrarily small when n is large. Based on Fano’s inequality, we have
H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,W ′1 = w′1,Y2) ≤ nδ2.
Hence, we have
H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,Y2) =
∑
w1,w
′
1
p(w1, w
′
1)H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,W ′1 = w′1,Y2) ≤ nδ2. (39)
By combining (36) with (37), (38) and (39), we have
H(W1|Y2) ≥ n [R1,s + (δ1 − ǫ1 − δ2)] = n (R1,s − ǫ) ,
where ǫ→ 0 as n→∞. Therefore, the secrecy constraint is satified.
B. Case II: R2 > I(X2;Y2|X1)
1) Codebook Parameters: We choose the following rate parameter for R′′1,d:
R′′1,d = I(X1;Y2)− ǫ1. (40)
Note that in the encoding, the interfering encoder selects w2 ∈ W2 at random and sends the codeword
x2(w2) to the channel. In order to prove for Case II, we assume that this is done as in the following procedure.
We suppose that the 2nR2 codewords in codebook C2 are randomly grouped into 2nR′2 bins each with 2nR′′2
codewords, where R′′2 = R2 − R′2. Therefore, any codeword in C2 is indexed as x2(w′2, w′′2) for w′2 ∈ W ′2 =
{1, . . . , 2nR′2} and w′′2 ∈ W ′′2 = {1, . . . , 2nR
′′
2 }. During encoding, the encoder at the helper selects w′2 ∈ W ′2
and w′′2 ∈ W ′′2 independently at random, and sends the codeword x2(w′2, w′′2 ). This is equivalent to that a
random codeword x2(w2) (w2 = w′2 × w′′2 ) is sent. To facilitate the proof, we let
R′′2 = I(X2;Y2|X1)− ǫ2. (41)
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2) Equivocation Computation: Following steps similar to those as given by (36), the equivocation at the
eavesdropper is bounded by:
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(W1|Y2,W ′1,W ′2)
≥ H(X1,X2|W ′1,W ′2)− I(X1,X2;Y2)−H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,W ′2,Y2). (42)
For the first term, we have that
H(X1,X2|W ′1,W ′2) = H(X1|W ′1) +H(X2|W ′2)
= n(R1,s +R
′′
1,d) + nR
′′
2 = n [R1,s + I(X1,X2;Y2)− ǫ3] , (43)
where ǫ3 = ǫ1 + ǫ2 → 0 as n→∞. For the second term, we have that
I(X1,X2;Y2) ≤ n [I(X1,X2;Y2)− δ1] . (44)
To bound the third term, we consider the (joint) decoding of W ′′1 and W ′′2 at the eavesdropper assuming
that W1, W ′1 and W ′2 are given to the eavesdropper as side information. For the rate pair (R′′1,d, R′′2) =
(I(X1;Y2)− ǫ1, I(X2;Y2|X2)− ǫ2), we can show that the probability of error is arbitrarily small when n is
large. Hence, we also have
H(X1,X2|W1,W ′1,W ′2,Y2) ≤ nδ2. (45)
By combining (42) with (43), (44) and (45), we have
H(W1|Y2) ≥ n [R1,s + (δ1 − ǫ3 − δ2)] = n (R1,s − ǫ) ,
where ǫ = ǫ3 + δ2 − δ1 → 0 as n→∞. Therefore, the secrecy constraint is also satified for case II.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: The secrecy requirement implies that
nRs = H(W1) ≤ H(W1|Y n2 ) + nǫ, (46)
and Fano’s inequality implies that
H(W1|Y n1 ) ≤ nǫR1 + h(ǫ) , nδ. (47)
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Based on (46) and (47), we have
nRs ≤ H(W1|Y n2 ) + nǫ
≤ H(W1|Y n2 )−H(W1|Y n1 ) + n(ǫ+ δ)
≤ H(W1|Y n2 )−H(W1|Y n1 , Y n2 ) + n(ǫ+ δ) (48)
= I(W1;Y
n
1 |Y n2 ) + n(ǫ+ δ)
≤ I(Xn1 ,Xn2 ;Y n1 |Y n2 ) + n(ǫ+ δ) (49)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i,X2,i;Y1,i|Y2,i) + n(ǫ+ δ), (50)
where (48) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (49) follows since W1 → (Xn1 ,Xn2 ) →
(Y n1 , Y
n
2 ) forms a Markov chain.
Now, it is observed that the secrecy capacity of the WT-HI depends only on the marginal distributions
PY1|X1,X2 and PY2|X1,X2 , and not on any further structure of the joint distribution PY1,Y2|X1,X2 . This can be
easily proved because the average error probability Pe defined by (1) depends on the marginal distribution
PY1|X1,X2 only, and the equivocation rate H(W1|Y n2 )/n depends on the marginal distribution PY2|X1,X2 only.
Hence, the secrecy capacity is the same for any channel described by (18) whose marginal distributions are
the same. We can replace (Y1, Y2) with (Y˜1, Y˜2) defined by (18) and obtain (17).
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: The achievability is based on the coding scheme introduced in Section III, with the input
distributions π chosen to be Gaussian N (0, P1) and N (0, P2) for C1 and C2, respectively. Here, we discuss
only the coding parameters R1, R2 and R1,d in Theorem 1.
When a ≥ 1+P2, which is the very strong eavesdropping case as discussed in Section III, we have Rs = 0.
Next, we discuss RIs(P1, P2) for the case when a ≤ 1 + P2. Here, we choose R2 = γ(P2) and R1,d =
γ
(
aP1
1+P2
)
.
1) When b ≥ 1+P1, we have R2 ≤ γ
(
bP2
1+P1
)
. In this case, we choose R1 = γ(P1). The intended receiver
can first perform a separate decoding using C2 and cancel interference, and then can decode at the rate of
R1 = γ(P1) using C1 (virtually a clean channel). The secrecy rate is Rs = R1−R1,d = γ(P1)−γ
(
aP1
1+P2
)
.
2) When 1 ≤ b ≤ 1 + P1, we have γ
(
bP2
1+P1
)
≤ R2 ≤ γ(bP2). In this case, we choose R1 = γ(P1 +
bP2) − γ(P2). The intended receiver performs joint decoding using C1 and C2. The secrecy rate is
Rs = R1 −R1,d = [γ(P1 + bP2)− γ(P2)]− γ
(
aP1
1+P2
)
= γ(P1 + bP2)− γ(aP1 + P2).
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3) When b ≤ 1, we have γ(P2) ≥ γ(bP2). In this case, we choose R1 = γ
(
P1
1+bP2
)
. The intended receiver
performs a separate decoding using C1. The secrecy rate is Rs = R1 −R1,d = γ
(
P1
1+bP2
)
− γ
(
aP1
1+P2
)
.
Under certain conditions, to choose R2 = 0 and R1,d = γ(aP1) can yield a higher secrecy rate. In this case,
the secrecy rate is RIIs (P1) = [γ(P1)− γ(aP1)]+. Therefore, max
(
RIs, R
II
s
)
can be achieved.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: First, we notice that RIIs can be viewed as a special result of RIs if power is optimized (by applying
power (P1, P2) = (P¯1, 0)). Hence, to optimize Rs given by (22), we can ignore RIIs and consider only the
optimization of RIs with respect to P1 and P2.
For convenience, we denote
Rs1 = γ(P1)− γ
(
aP1
1 + P2
)
,
Rs2 = γ(P1 + bP2)− γ(aP1 + P2),
and Rs3 = γ
(
P1
1 + bP2
)
− γ
(
aP1
1 + P2
)
,
which are all functions of P1 and P2. Depending on the channel parameters (a, b) and power (P1, P2), only
one of the three functions is active. When 0 ≤ P1 ≤ P¯1 and 0 ≤ P2 ≤ P¯2, all three functions are bounded.
Therefore, there always exists a global maximum, which might be a maximum of one certain function or at
a cross point of two functions. The subsections below is to search for the maximum point by checking the
gradients and comparing with the boundary points.
Since we care about the sign of the (partial) derivatives of these functions, for convenience, we say that two
real numbers x and y satisfy x ∽ y if they have the same sign. It can be shown that we have
∂Rs1
∂P1
∽ 1− a+ P2, ∂Rs2
∂P1
∽
∂Rs3
∂P1
∽ 1− a+ (1− ab)P2,
∂Rs1
∂P2
≥ 0, ∂Rs2
∂P2
∽ b− 1 + (ab− 1)P1,
and ∂Rs3
∂P2
∽
[
b(ab− 1)P 22 + 2b(a− 1)P2 + a− b+ a(1− b)P1
]
P1,
and all cases are discussed in the following subsections.
A. a > 1
For the case when a > 1, we consider b > 1, a−1 < b ≤ 1, and b ≤ a−1, respectively.
1) b > 1:
i) P¯2 ≤ a− 1: we cannot obtain a positive secrecy rate, and therefore, (P1, P2) = (0, 0).
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ii) P¯2 > a− 1: we choose (P1, P2) = (min(P¯1, P ∗1 ), P¯2) because of the following:
If P¯1 ≤ b − 1, Rs1 is active, (∂Rs1∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs1∂P2 ≥ 0) and therefore (P1, P2) = (P¯1, P¯2). Now if
P¯1 > b− 1, once we choose P1 > P ∗1 , Rs2 is active and (∂Rs2∂P1 ≤ 0, ∂Rs1∂P2 ≥ 0). This forces us to
set (P1, P2) = (P ∗1 , P¯2).
2) a−1 < b ≤ 1: Rs3 is active, and we have (∂Rs3∂P1 ≤ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≤ 0). Therefore, (P1, P2) = (0, 0).
3) b ≤ a−1: Rs3 is active.
i) P¯2 ≤ a−11−ab : (∂Rs3∂P1 ≤ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≤ 0) and therefore, (P1, P2) = (0, 0).
ii) P¯2 > a−11−ab : we choose (P1, P2) = (P¯1,min(P¯2, P ∗2 )) because of the following
If a−11−ab < P¯2 ≤ P ∗2 , (∂Rs3∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≥ 0) and therefore (P1, P2) = (P¯1, P¯2). Now if P¯2 > P ∗2 ,
once we choose P2 > P ∗2 , (∂Rs3∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≤ 0). This forces us to set (P1, P2) = (P¯1, P ∗2 ).
B. a ≤ 1
For the case when a ≤ 1, we consider b > a−1, 1 < b ≤ a−1, and b ≤ 1, respectively.
1) b > a−1:
i) P¯1 ≤ b−1: Rs1 is active and we have (∂Rs1∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs1∂P2 ≥ 0). Therefore, we have (P1, P2) = (P¯2, P¯2).
ii) P¯1 > b− 1: If P¯2 ≤ 1−aab−1 , Rs2 is active, (∂Rs2∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs2∂P2 ≥ 0) and therefore we choose (P1, P2) =
(P¯1, P¯2). Now if P¯2 > 1−aab−1 , once we choose P2 >
1−a
ab−1 , (
∂Rs2
∂P1
≤ 0, ∂Rs1
∂P2
≥ 0). This forces us to
choose (P1, P2) = (P ∗1 , P¯2). After comparing with the rate achieved by using (P1, P2) = (P¯1, 1−aab−1 ),
we find that (P1, P2) = (P ∗1 , P¯2) is better.
2) 1 < b ≤ a−1:
i) P¯1 ≤ b−11−ab : when P¯1 ≤ b−1, Rs1 is active and we have (∂Rs1∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs1∂P2 ≥ 0); when b−1 < P¯1 ≤
b−1
1−ab , Rs2 is active and we have (
∂Rs2
∂P1
≥ 0, ∂Rs2
∂P2
≥ 0). Therefore, we choose (P1, P2) = (P¯1, P¯2).
ii) P¯1 > b−11−ab : we choose (P1, P2) = (P¯1, 0) because of the following:
If one chooses P1 > b−11−ab , Rs2 is active and (
∂Rs2
∂P1
≥ 0, ∂Rs2
∂P2
≤ 0), therefore we need (P1, P2) =
(P¯1, 0). After comparing with (P1, P2) = ( b−11−ab , P¯2), we find that (P1, P2) = (P¯1, 0) is better.
3) b ≤ 1: Rs3 is active.
i) P¯1 ≤ b−aa(1−b) : since (∂Rs3∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≤ 0), we choose (P1, P2) = (P¯1, 0).
ii) P¯1 > b−aa(1−b) : we choose (P1, P2) = (P¯1,min(P¯2, P ∗2 )) because of the following:
If P¯2 ≤ P ∗2 , (∂Rs3∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≥ 0), and we choose (P1, P2) = (P¯1, P¯2). If P¯2 > P ∗2 and once
choosing P2 > P ∗2 , (∂Rs3∂P1 ≥ 0, ∂Rs3∂P2 ≤ 0). This forces us to choose (P1, P2) = (P1, P ∗2 ).
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APPENDIX V
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: When b > max(1, a−1), the power policy uses (P1, P2) = (P ∗1 , P¯2), where P ∗1 = b−1. Therefore,
the achievable secrecy rate is
Rs = γ (P
∗
1 )− γ
(
aP ∗1
1 + P¯2
)
=
1
2
log b− 1
2
log
(
1 +
a(b− 1)
1 + P¯2
)
.
After taking the limit with respect of P¯2, we have Rs = 12 log b.
When b < min(1, a−1), the power policy uses (P1, P2) = (P¯1, P ∗2 ), where P ∗2 is given by (25) and can be
shown to be
P ∗2 =
√
(a− b− ab)P¯1
b(1− ab) ,
when P¯1 is large. The achievable secrecy rate is
Rs = γ
(
P¯1
1 + bP ∗2
)
− γ
(
aP¯1
1 + P ∗2
)
.
After taking the limit with respect of P¯1, we have Rs = 12 log
1
ab
.
For other cases, the power policy uses P2 = 0 and the achievable secrecy rate remains at Rs = 12
[
log2
1
a
]+
.
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF LEMMA (3)
Proof: To use the result given by (17), we let
Y˜1 = X1 +
√
bX2 + Z˜1 (51)
and Y˜2 =
√
aX1 +X2 + Z˜2, (52)
where Z˜1 and Z˜2 are arbitrarily correlated Gaussian random variables with zero-means and unit variances. We
also let ρ denote the covariance between Z˜1 and Z˜2, i.e.,
Cov(Z˜1, Z˜2) = ρ.
It can be observed that PY1,Y2|X1,X2 and PY˜1,Y˜2|X1,X2 have the same marginal distribution and satisfy the
condition given by (18).
Note that I(X1,X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) is a function of the transmit powers P1 and P2, and the noise covariance ρ.
Hence, we denote it by
I(X1,X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) = f(P1, P2, ρ). (53)
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Now we show that f(P1, P2, ρ) can be evaluated by (32). To show this, I(X1,X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) is evaluated as
I(X1,X2; Y˜1|Y˜2)
= I(X1,X2; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X1,X2; Y˜2)
= [H(Y˜1, Y˜2)−H(Y˜1, Y˜2|X1,X2)]− [h(Y˜2)− h(Y˜2|X1,X2)]
= h(Y˜1|Y˜2)− h(Z˜1|Z˜2)
= h(Y˜1|Y˜2)− 1
2
log[2πe(1 − ρ2)]. (54)
For convenience, we let
t =
E[Y˜1Y˜2]
E[Y˜ 22 ]
. (55)
We have
h(Y˜1|Y˜2) = h(Y˜1 − tY˜2|Y˜2)
≤ h(Y˜1 − tY˜2) (56)
≤ 1
2
log[2πeVar(Y˜1 − tY˜2)], (57)
where (57) follows from the maximum-entropy theorem and both equalities in (56) and (57) hold true when
(X1,X2) are Gaussian.
Furthermore, we have
Var(Y˜1 − tY˜2) = 1 + P1 + bP2 − (ρ+
√
aP1 +
√
bP2)
2
1 + aP1 + P2
.
Hence, I(X1,X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) can be evaluated by (32).
It is easy to verify that f(P1, P2, ρ) is an increasing function of both P1 and P2 for any given ρ, and
f(P1, P2, ρ) is a convex function of ρ for any given P1 and P2. It can be shown that when P1 and P2 are
given, the minimum of f(P1, P2, ρ) occurs when ρ is chosen to be ρ⋆ given by (33).
Therefore, the Sato-type upper bound can be calculated as
min
ρ
max
(P1,P2)
f(P1, P2, ρ) = f(P¯1, P¯2, ρ
∗(P¯1, P¯2)).
APPENDIX VII
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: Based on the secrecy requirement given by (46) and Fano’s inequality given by (47), we have
nRs ≤ H(W1|Y n2 )−H(W1|Y n1 ) + n(ǫ+ δ)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 )− I(W1;Y n2 ) + n(ǫ+ δ).
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For simplicity, we omit the term n(ǫ+ δ) since it does not change the result. Now we let
V n1 = X
n
1 + Z
n
1 (58)
and V n2 =
√
aXn1 + Z
n
2 , (59)
and proceed with the following steps:
nRs ≤ I(W1;Y n1 , V n1 )− I(W1;Y n2 , V n2 ) + I(W1;V n2 |Y n2 )
= I(W1;V
n
1 ) + I(W1;Y
n
1 |V n1 )− I(W1;V n2 )− I(W1;Y n2 |V n2 ) + I(W1;V n2 |Y n2 )
= I(W1;V
n
1 )− I(W1;V n2 ) + I(W1;V n2 |Y n2 ), (60)
where we use the fact that I(W1;Y n1 |V n1 ) = 0 and I(W1;Y n2 |V n2 ) = 0 since each of W1 ↔ V n1 ↔ Y n1 and
W1 ↔ V n2 ↔ Y n2 forms a Markov chain. We therefore have
nRs ≤ [I(W1;V n1 )− I(W1;V n2 )]+ + I(W1;V n2 |Y n2 ). (61)
Based on the result for the Gaussian wire-tap channel [3], we have
[I(W1;V
n
1 )− I(W1;V n2 )]+ ≤
n
2
[
log(1 + P¯1)− log(1 + aP¯1)
]+
. (62)
Now, we bound I(W1;V n2 |Y n2 ) via the following steps:
I(W1;V
n
2 |Y n2 ) ≤ I(W1,Xn1 ;V n2 |Y n2 )
= I(Xn1 ;V
n
2 |Y n2 )
= h(V n2 |Y n2 )− h(V n2 |Xn1 , Y n2 )
= [h(Y n2 , V
n
2 )− h(Y n2 , V n2 |Xn1 )]− h(Y n2 ) + h(Y n2 |Xn1 )
= I(Xn1 ;Y
n
2 , V
n
2 )− h(Y n2 ) + h(Y n2 |Xn1 ).
Since
I(Xn1 ;Y
n
2 , V
n
2 ) = I(X
n
1 ;V
n
2 ) = h(V
n
2 )− h(Zn2 ),
we have
I(W ;V n2 |Y n2 ) ≤ h(V n2 ) + h(Y n2 |Xn1 )− h(Y n2 )− h(Zn2 )
= h(
√
aXn1 + Z
n
2 ) + h(X
n
2 + Z
n
2 )− h(
√
aXn1 +X
n
2 + Z
n
2 )− h(Zn2 ). (63)
Since we assume that Xn1 and Xn2 are independent (and both are also independent of Zn2 ), based on the
subset sum entropy power inequality (EPI) [25], we have
exp
(
2
n
h(
√
aXn1 +X
n
2 + Z
n
2 )
)
≥ 1
2
[
exp
(
2
n
h(
√
aXn1 + Z
n
2 )
)
+ exp
(
2
n
h(Xn2 + Z
n
2 )
)]
. (64)
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By letting t1 = h(
√
aXn1 + Z
n
2 ) and t2 = h(Xn2 + Zn2 ), we have
h(
√
aXn1 +X
n
2 + Z
n
2 ) ≥
n
2
{
log
[
exp
(
2t1
n
)
+ exp
(
2t2
n
)]
− log 2
}
. (65)
Using (65) in (63), we obtain
I(W ;V n2 |Y n2 ) ≤ t1 + t2 −
n
2
{
log
[
exp
(
2t1
n
)
+ exp
(
2t2
n
)]
− log 2
}
− n
2
log(2πe)
=
n
2
log

 exp
(
2(t1+t2)
n
)
exp
(
2t1
n
)
+ exp
(
2t2
n
)

− n
2
log(πe). (66)
Note that the bound given by (66) is an increasing function of both t1 and t2. From the maximum-entropy
theorem, we have
t1 ≤ n
2
log
(
2πe(1 + aP¯1)
)
,
t2 ≤ n
2
log
(
2πe(1 + P¯2)
)
,
where the equalities hold when both Xn1 and Xn2 are i.i.d. Gaussian. Therefore,
I(W1;V
n
2 |Y n2 ) ≤
n
2
log
[
2(1 + aP¯1)(1 + P¯2)
2 + aP¯1 + P¯2
]
. (67)
Finally, by combining (61), (62), and (67), we obtain the upper bound given by (34).
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